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ABSTRACT
Th e Hungarian banking system has changed greatly in the last 30 years.  We could 
see even greater changes in the type and magnitude of ﬁ nancial risks worldwide. 
On the following few pages, I will make an attempt at describing where the 
Hungarian two-tier banking system and securities market started from 30 years 
ago as well as the main challenges I see today and looking ahead to the near 
future.1 But ﬁ rst I would like to address the problems and pitfalls of long-term 
retrospection brieﬂ y.
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1 WHAT DOES LONG-TERM RETROSPECTION REVEAL?
With all likelihood, a distorted image.
It has become well-known based on the work of Nobel laureate in psychology 
Kahnemann that the past is recollected in our brain and our decisions are rational 
in a way that is diﬀ erent from what we would naively think logical. He has provided 
experimental evidence that when we recall events from the more distant past (e.g. 
our summer holiday the year before), we remember their beginning, their end, the 
best and the worst parts, but not really durations.2 As another important ﬁ nding, 
what is frequently mentioned springs to mind more easily. To provide an example, 
imagine that a man cheated on his wife. What do you think is more likely: that 
he is a politician or a baker? Most probably, we would guess it was an unfeeling, 
1  Th is review was written for the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the Hungarian Banking 
Association, but it is not about the 30 years of operation of either the Association or the banking 
system. It is purely intended to highlight some characteristic traits of the past and present operating 
conditions of the banking system, focussing on risks and the general attitude to them.
2  We are gnawing our ﬁ ngernails with excitement in the third act of an opera to see whether the 
protagonist can make it to his dying lover in time.
On the other hand, it is of no concern whether he arrives 5 minutes, 5 days or 5 months earlier.
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unscrupulous politician rather than a diligent baker. It does not matter that there 
are far more bakers around3. However, there is extensive newspaper coverage of 
politicians’ oﬀ enses, which we therefore more readily recollect. 
If I would ask now what the greatest (ﬁ nancial) systemic risk was in the last 
30  years, I suspect that most people would mention foreign currency lending. 
And few would recall fears of infl ation expectations spinning out of control in 
the ‘90s. It was a long time ago, and eventually, inﬂ ation did not get loose. Still, 
it is much more likely that a sequence of 5, 15 and 25 inﬂ ation is followed by 
inﬂ ation rates of 40 and 60, rather than a reverse trend. MNB (the central 
bank of Hungary), governed then by György Surányi, switched from ad hoc and 
abrupt exchange rate devaluations of a signiﬁ cant extent to a continuous, sliding 
devaluation of extents announced in advance. By doing so, they could reliably 
bridle and gradually temper expectations.
Of thing past, long-ago risks are especially hard to remember. Even more so, if a 
risk – although it was serious – ﬁ nally did not materialise. It feels as if it was not 
real at all.4 On the contrary, we take low risks which eventually materialised very 
seriously now. Risks are hard to remember and even harder to control. Among 
other things, because of the reasons mentioned above. I will elaborate on this in 
Section 3. 
One might think that commonly known objective facts and the past organised 
into data series are easy to survey. For example, which were more dramatic and 
which were more peaceful times. Aft er all, a fact is a fact no matter how you look 
at it.
Let us test this hypothesis. Consider the HUF-USD exchange rate over the last 
decades. 
3  Even though we consume much more nonsense than bread.
4  Th ere are a few exceptions, though, e.g. the Cuban missile crisis. But it is also true that we can 
frequently see related short documentaries on various TV channels.
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Chart 1 
USD/HUF exchange rate at the beginning of the year (at the top)
and HUF 1,000 in USD at the beginning of the year (at the bottom)
Source: Exchange rates at the beginning of the year, 1949–2017 (MNB)
On the USD/HUF exchange rate chart at the top, the 1968 USD revaluation from 
HUF 11.74 to HUF 30 is barely traceable. Th at was, however, the most dramatic 
event in the history of the inverse exchange rate, shown on the chart at the bottom. 
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While the drop in the exchange rate from 282 in 2001 to 174 in 2008 is sharp on the 
chart at the top, it does not leave almost any mark in the chart at the bottom. Th e 
same events are perceived diﬀ erently by an analyst in New York and another one 
in Budapest, because their points of reference are diﬀ erent.
Any raw exchange rate chart is necessarily distorted, if orders of magnitude 
change in the meantime. When the Budapest Stock Exchange index (BUX) is 
considered, the Asian and Russian crises are negligible in comparison with the 
2008 recession. Th e problem is that we cannot gauge by eye that a 10 decrease 
or increase at the level of thousands is as signiﬁ cant a change as one at the level of 
thirty thousands. Only, the latter looks 30 times larger on the chart. 
Th erefore, looking back, even objective data are distorted to some extent and 
events which were felt serious in their time may lose signiﬁ cance.5 Roads are 
getting narrower in the distance, no matter if we look forwards or backwards. 
How did Kölcsey say it? ‘Ponder anew why the time is now, compare it well to the 
future…’6.
Or slightly paraphrased: compare the present time to the distant past with 
circumspection.
Having dealt with the problems of comparison, let us look at the position where 
Hungarian commercial banks, the stock exchange, and supporting institutions 
for ﬁ nancial and banking education and research started 30 years ago.7 
5  Th e appendix to this paper contains some supplementary charts illustrating how relative chang-
es can be emphasised and thereby processes made comparable in time. It is surprisingly easy.
6  Ferenc Kölcsey: Huszt (1831, English translation by Watson Kirkconnell and Ádám 
Makkai).
7  I found it useful to highlight a few elements evoking the atmosphere of the time, which are no 
longer present but were very much there then (e.g. Soviet military barracks all over the country), or 
on the contrary, are taken for granted now but most people would not have dreamt of back then (con-
vertibility, bank cards, a passport to the West). Even more important diﬀ erences are the presence of 
the Internet and forms of communication like PPTs (Power Point presentations). 
Th is short discussion is not intended as an assessment. It is only a recollection of certain processes 
that the author has actively taken part in or was witness to. For the same reason, the author is 
required to specify his stance to the three decades under review. He has been working full-time at 
the Department of Finance of the University of Economics from 1976 (the name of the institution, 
currently Corvinus University of Budapest, has changed repeatedly over time, just like street names). 
From 1983, he has been a part-time associate of the Department of International Financial Policy 
of MNB and then the International Training Center for Bankers. He was on the ﬁ rst Council of the 
Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) as a member responsible for training and the development of the 
examination system, and later, from 1995 to 1996, as Chairman of the BSE. He was a member of the 
Central Bank Council (now Monetary Council of the MNB) in the second half of the ‘90s.
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2 FROM BUST TO BOOM: IMF, THE TWO-TIER BANKING SYSTEM,
THE INTERNATIONAL TRAINING CENTER FOR BANKERS AND BSE 
‘Damage always comes with a reward’ – my old neighbour Mimi used to say. In 
1982, several countries around the world were going through a grave ﬁ nancial 
crisis. Hungary was among the ﬁ rst countries going insolvent in a row as a result of 
the crisis. It was in this period that István Szalkai wrote his 17-page, later classiﬁ ed 
essay, which was presented also to the Political Committee of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) and based on which Hungary rapidly became 
the ﬁ rst member country under Socialist rule of International Monetary Fund 
in the greatest secrecy. According to Miklós Pulai, former Deputy Governor of 
MNB, the IMF membership had been on the agenda since the mid-1960s but was 
postponed for as long as possible.
It was the ﬁ rst step in the 20-year long process of Hungary’s Euro-Atlantic 
integration and the rise of a diﬀ erent approach to ﬁ nance in the country. In this 
period, the Institution for Financial Research of the Ministry of Finance, or Finan-
cial Research Plc., led by István Hagelmayer, was an important hub of intellectual 
life in ﬁ nance. MNB had unchallenged professional authority both inland and 
abroad. Th e Department of Finance of the Budapest University of Economics 
headed by Miklós Riesz was also working away. All three institutions were highly 
progressive, reformist places – downright bold within the Socialist bloc8. Th e 
bonds issued for the international markets ﬁ rst in the region by MNB and Hun-
gary also counted as a rarity within the Eastern bloc. For a long time aft er the 
Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, only MNB could get a Western loan. Th is was 
not possible for even the Investment Bank of the COMECON at the time.
Th ese days – mainly because of the inﬂ uence of television, I reckon – the 
omnipotent approach of rapid intervention and immediate eff ect becomes more 
and more entrenched in us. 
Not only in the case of ultra-fast and eff ective painkillers: it is as though 
walnut trees were growing tall instantly. Systems of diff erence equations 
analysing delayed eff ects have faded away from university curricula. 
8  At the universities of the Socialist bloc, it was uniformly taught based on Marx that gold is the ab-
solute money. From Miklós Riesz’s coursebook, students could and still learn about the operation 
of the modern fi at money system. He pioneered in teaching what is regarded now as modern banking, 
which gradually replaced Soviet-type lending practice in the curricula. 
At the History of Economic Th ought course of Antal Mátyás, in addition to the theories of Smith 
and Ricardo and the economic philosophy of Keynes, Friedman and Hayek, everyone could get fa-
miliar with the basic concepts of modern economics. I still know the deﬁ nition of marginal rate of 
substitution, but I have already forgotten its Marxist critique... 
It was something of a paradox that we learned modern concepts at a history course, but such were the 
times. At least we had a possibility to do so, unlike our neighbours. 
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But spillover eﬀ ects develop through years or decades, multiply relayed. Th e 
Institution for Financial Research was a cradle of intellectual thought in the ‘70s 
and ‘80s. It gave almost a dozen Ministers, Central Bank Governors and Deputy 
Governors, SAO Presidents and heads of ﬁ nancial supervision. Th ose how 
listened closely, could recognise the legacy of Miklós Riesz’s lectures in the central 
bank’s philosophy under the governance of Surányi. Th e reasons for Hungary’s 
overwhelming advantage in the ﬁ eld of ﬁ nance in the ‘90s over former Socialist 
countries of the region ran deep. 
30 years ago, we were the ﬁ rst country within the region to have a two-tier bank-
ing system, a stock exchange or a training institution for bankers and brokers. We 
were also ﬁ rst to join international professional organisations such as the EFFAS 
(European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies) or the CEMS (Community 
of European Management Schools, now the Global Alliance in Management 
Education). Th e ﬁ rst provides access to an international degree recognised in 30 
countries and the latter enabled several thousands of Hungarian students already 
to learn for a semester at the most prestigious European business schools.
All that was not achieved overnight, or as the result of a gentle revolution. Ist-
ván Hagelmayer wrote several articles already in the late ‘60s about the need to 
introduce the two-tier banking system. 
As a sign of intellectual ferment, KJK (Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Publis-
hing House of Economics and Law) published a series of volumes or anthologies 
by Nobel laureates in economics from the ‘70s on. Th e ﬁ rst volume of the seri-
es was on Samuelsonian economics, which immediately became part of the 
university curriculum. By making these thoughts accessible, the series implicitly 
legitimised them since they came from by a state-owned publisher. KJK published 
the volume Bonds [A kötvény], written by Bánfi , Sulyok and Száz) in 1986, which, 
in addition to being the ﬁ rst book on securities written by Hungarian authors in 
four decades, disseminated the criteria, concepts an calculations of investment 
in bonds to a wide audience. Th ere was no obstacle to its incorporation into the 
curriculum at the University of Economics and later elsewhere. As a forerunner 
to the stock exchange, the Secretariat for Securities Trading (Értékpapír-kereske-
delmi Titkárság) was established in 1987, led by Zsigmond Járai. Initially, it mainly 
traded city council bonds.
Th e need for a sock exchange in a Socialist economy was advocated by Tamás 
Bácskai from the early ‘80s.9 It is no coincidence that the ﬁ rst stock exchange 
9  His views evoked a strong response also abroad. He was even invited to Vietnam, but as he was 
reluctant to have the necessary vaccines and the long ﬂ ight, it was me who had the chance to hold 
my very ﬁ rst English lecture to a full house at the National Th eatre in Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City). 
Th e English Ambassador was sitting in the ﬁ rst row and the Soviet Commercial Attaché was taking 
notes behind him in the second. Another speaker invited to the two-day event was the International 
Director of the London Stock Exchange. Despite Hungary’s minor signiﬁ cance, it attracted much 
international attention that a Socialist country was planning to have a stock exchange.
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conference was chaired by him in 1989. It marked a breakthrough into public 
consciousness. For the ﬁ rst time, the stock exchange was mentioned in the 
TV news as a legitimate institution and not as an imperialist abnormality. Th e 
conference was the ﬁ rst occasion that Zsigmond Járai publicly promoted the need 
for establishing a regulated domestic securities market. Until that day, the word 
‘stock exchange’ was – explicitly – taboo (just like Trianon and 1956). From then 
on, people and the media could legitimately speak about the stock exchange. 
Th ere was a considerable trading volume in bonds but shares were yet to come. 
Th e Budapest Stock Exchange was also a pioneer within the Socialist region 
for years10, although its Warsaw counterpart soon became a serious rival. 
Notwithstanding, the BSE was no longer a simple stock market by the mid-90s, 
but an integrated bond and stock market and a derivatives market, epitomised 
by the MMTS (Multi-Market Trading System) soft ware used at the BSE for two 
decades. Th at meant an advantage of several years over the Vienna stock exchange 
where the futures and options exchange (ÖTOB) was integrated only later with 
the Wiener Börse. Interestingly, it was Vienna where we picked up the ﬁ rst pieces 
of knowledge about the stock exchange in the late ‘80s. 
Banks and the revived securities market had a special relationship. Even in 
hindsight, it is remarkable that instead of setting up dedicated divisions for 
securities trading in house, banks had a statutory obligation to establish legally 
separate brokerage ﬁ rms and investment banks. Th ey could trade in sovereign 
debt instruments only through these entities. Banks had enough of that aft er a 
time, but still, that initial state of full separation was highly important for the 
evolution of the securities market. Bank lobby would have been strong enough 
to avoid this arrangement, but the leaders of the most important large banks had 
suﬃ  cient wisdom and foresight to let legal regulation develop this way.11 Self-
restraint is a virtue at all times and in all walks of life. Pity that it is less and less 
appreciated in this day and age.
10  ‘Pioneer’ should be taken literally. Th e ﬁ rst stock exchange conference in Romania was organised 
by the Hungarian student association of the University of Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca), in the university 
hall decorated with ﬂ owers. It was covered by Romanian state television. As apart from the repre-
sentatives of the BSE, MNB Vice-Governor György Szapáry and President of the securities authority 
Zoltán Pacsi were also invited, the event was visited also by stakeholders from Bucharest. It was a 
breakthrough in the development of Romanian markets, similar to that mentioned in the case of 
Budapest. Adevarul Cluj did not fail to point out with disapproval that it was not organised in Bu-
charest, by Romanians...
11  Even wealthy aristocrats let their heirs go and see the world for themselves for a while. Th is anal-
ogy is ﬁ tting also considering that these brokerage ﬁ rms springing up from nowhere had relatively 
young leaders, typically in their thirties or forties, while large banks have always been managed by 
more experienced professionals. Th is evolving market therefore had a chance to take its own course 
of development, untouched by intrabank hierarchies. However, some intuitive carefulness might 
also have been at play. Securities were brand new territory. Moreover, some might have felt it politi-
cally risky to trade in these instruments at a large Socialist state-owned bank.
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In the ‘90s, there was a procession of visitors from neighbouring countries, coming 
to see and emulate the operating model of the Training Center for Bankers, among 
others. MNB and the Hungarian Banking Association, and in particular Imre Ta-
rafás and Miklós Pulai provided eﬀ ective and long-term assistance to the Training 
Center, the ﬁ rst training institution for bankers in the region. Although it may be 
hard to imagine now, the liquidity managers of several large banks have met in 
person for the ﬁ rst time at the very ﬁ rst (Liquidity management and monetary 
policy) course of the Training Center. While today everything is interconnected 
through a thousand diﬀ erent channels (mainly electronically), everything was in 
a nascent state back then. Aft er the development of the two-tier banking system, 
the necessary commercial banking know-how was imported by Hungarian banks 
jointly, in close cooperation (‘alliance’) based on mutual support. Th e Training 
Center for Bankers was a practical tool that banks established jointly for this 
purpose.
3 ON RISKS
3.1 Chances of regulation
in an increasingly unpredictable and rapidly changing world
Means of central risk12 management applied in the world naively and with high 
hopes for a long time were the pegging of rates (i.e. the currency regime backed by 
gold, established at the end of WWII in Bretton Woods and used until the early 
‘70s) or the interest rate cap used in the USA, complemented by a restriction on 
paying interest on sight deposits.13 Th ese initiated an endless cops and robbers 
game between regulators and the regulated entities, which is euphemistically 
called ‘fi nancial innovations’ or ‘fi nancial engineering’ in the literature.
Th e fi rst marvellous invention for bypassing the regulation were overnight 
repos. Is it forbidden to pay interest during the day on sight deposits? No 
problem. Let’s sell sovereign bonds to clients overnight and conclude a next-
morning forward repurchase agreement at a set price so that depositors earn 
their daily interest from the diff erence between the sale and repurchase price.14 
12  Of the numerous types of banking risks, the following paragraphs will be restricted to a discus-
sion of changes in market risk over the last decades, which is a well-deﬁ ned problem, with abundant 
data available. Th is does not mean that I underestimate the signiﬁ cance of operating (IT), credit and 
other risks.
13  Under the Socialist regime, everything had a ﬁ xed price for a long time. Th e interest payable on 
residential deposits was ﬁ xed for decades at 2, 3 and 5, depending on maturity.
14  Th ere was a laxative commercial in Hungary before the war: ‘While you are asleep Darmol does 
the trick.’ Maybe this was the inspiration for overnight repos.
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Attempts at stricter regulation of the market multiply the number of products 
that cunningly get around the current rules. Th e emerging newer and newer 
products not only puzzle clients, but regulatory authorities may also be late to 
recognise their substance and the associated risks. What is worse, even corporate 
control systems may lose track of what is going on within the company. Th ere are 
quite a few notorious examples to mention. 
Derivatives, these exotic products of highly obscure content are the number one 
instruments to wrap up or mask certain transactions. 
Let us take the simplest example. When lending is prohibited between 
two market participants, a very deep in-the-money put option is a perfect 
solution to circumvent the prohibition. Th e price of such an option is 
basically the present value of the exercise price. It is paid up front by the 
buyer of the option, who receives the exercise price later at expiration. Th ere 
are no irregularities involved. And the underlying asset can be anything.
Derivatives are not invented for the sole purpose of circumventing the rules. 
While in theory, they should minimise risk, they would not have suﬃ  ciently 
liquidity but for the activity of speculators. Th ey can reap tidy proﬁ ts15, partly 
because they are typically high-leverage instruments and partly because their 
pricing entails a possibility to take advantage of better information16. 
3.2 Th eory and practice
Th e basic terms that come up today at university courses on investment analysis 
are arbitrage, martingale and the Wiener process. Th e last term stands for a 
continuous-time stochastic process, in which every point is a breakpoint. In 
other words, it follows an inﬁ nitely jagged path. Zooming in on smaller periods 
in stock price and exchange rate graphs, we see that they do not ﬂ atten out and the 
zigzag motion remains.17 Any small section of the trajectory of a Wiener-process 
is inﬁ nitely long with jumps on jumps on jumps, etc.
Th is is all good and certainly very intriguing for some professionals, but why is 
it important? Personally, I also thought of it as a highly abstract mathematical 
15  In some cases, at minimum risk; see the case of LTCM.
16  To put it simply: one can always ﬁ nd a poor fool who buys into the highlighted beneﬁ ts of a 
gamma swap.
17  In this sense, exchange rates exhibit fractal behaviour. Th ose who are unfamiliar with the subject 
may gain quick and spectacular insight into it by typing the search term ‘Koch curve’ into Google 
and looking at the related drawings. 
While drawing the section of a parabola back in school took a single stroke, even the smallest interval 
of a Wiener process would use up an inﬁ nite number of pencils since it is inﬁ nitely long because of 
the constant jumps in random directions.
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construct, which is of primary interest for particle physicists willing to describe 
the motion of tiny particles. Until a hot summer day on which I was requested to 
advise on one of the brokerage ﬁ rm scandals of the recent past. Th e question to be 
answered was whether the ﬁ gures sent by the fraudulent company to its clients on 
a monthly basis were realistic. 
Let us have a closer look at this question. It is one that may rightly be asked in the 
case of a deposit. For instance, if its annual interest rate is 12, is it realistic that 
it earns 8 in 3 months? Obviously not. However, if we talk about a stock with 
an annual expected interest rate of 12, is 8 interest in 3 days realistic? Th at is 
where the hitch is.
What my calculations made on the basis of historical end-of-day stock quotes 
revealed on that hot summer day was that it is not only possible, but that there 
is a positive probability for even a 100 or 10,000 times that ﬁ gure. Change in 
the Wiener process is inﬁ nite. Each outcome within the process needs to be 
interpreted in terms of the probability of the observed outcome. However, the 
probability of each possible outcome within the Wiener-process is zero, but one 
will certainly occur.
At this point, lawyers and accountants would certainly stop and call it a day. Th ey 
are dealing with facts.18 
Before discussing the accountant’s perspective, let us have a closer look at the 
numbers.
Between January 1991 and July 2007, the daily closing price of the BUX index 
soared from 1,000 to 30,000. 
Th ose who invested HUF 1 into BUX at the beginning of that period, and did not 
do anything during the 4,115 trading days, ended up with HUF 30. 
Let us plot the development of the BUX index with its daily motions arranged, 
i.e. instead of alternating losses and gains, great gains come fi rst and then losses 
follow from small to great. As a result, the BUX would look like this (only the 
fi rst and the last value corresponds with the actual BUX time series):
18  By contrast, years aft er the tragic event, a court panel is still mulling over why so many high 
schoolers died in a bus that had caught ﬁ re. Would there be a judgment by now, if by a great stroke 
of luck, the bus had not caught ﬁ re, even though the catastrophe was going to happen with almost 
absolute certainty?  
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Chart 2 
Development of the BUX (1991–2007), with daily motions arranged
Th e chart does not show that the right end of the curve is 30 times higher. 
So great was the magnitude of the incurred losses and gains. If someone 
could foretell on which days would the stock market go up and opened a long 
position on these days only to close it at the end of the day, they could have 
made HUF 16.5 billion out of HUF 1 (1.65 × 1010, with previous gains also 
reinvested). Th is means a tenfold increase of more than 10 times.
Of course, someone who guesses correctly on which days is the stock market 
up (52% of the trading days under review) also knows on which days it is 
down. If they opened a short position on these days, they would have made 
a total of HUF 9.1 × 1018. In other words, short selling would result in an 
additional tenfold increase of 8 times.
Th ese are inconceivable amounts19. If our investor decided to divide one 
thousandth of the accumulated wealth to 107 (ten million) fellow countrymen, 
each of them would receive HUF 9.1 × 108, .i.e. HUF 910 million. 
As good as the story is, it has a certain probability. Th e probability of 
acquiring such an enormous wealth is the same as that of having 4,000 
correct guesses of heads or tails. 
Th e parable above, based on actual data, illustrated that huge proﬁ ts can be made 
on the market, but with very low probability. We also know since Kahneman that 
the human brain is especially insensitive to low probabilities, and in general, it is 
intuitively unable to cope with uncertainty. But these are at the very heart of the 
question. What is the extent that already counts as unrealistic?
19  And we did not even consider possible gains from intraday price ﬂ uctuations. Now let us imagine 
all these on a millisecond scale in high-frequency trading.
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To move on to the accountant’s perspective, let us take a big leap back into the 
past to medieval Italy.
3.3 Luca Paciolo (1494) and the problem of the points
Luca Paciolo was a Franciscan friar (he also collaborated with Leonardo da Vin-
ci). In his book Summa de arithmetica, geometria, Proportioni et proportionalita, 
published in 1494, he discusses, among others, the following problem:
Two people are playing heads or tails. One of them wins if it is head and the 
other one if it is tail. Th e player who fi rst obtains 6 successes wins the money 
they have jointly paid in. Th e game is interrupted at the state of 5:3. How the 
money should be allocated fairly?
Paciolo’s solution (5/8 and 3/8) was completely in line with his accountant’s 
perspective based on past facts. It is not without reason that he is considered the 
inventor of double-entry accounting and thus the father of accounting. Only, his 
solution is wrong. 
150 years later, Chevalier de Méré posed the same problem to Blaise Pascal, who, in 
correspondence with Fermat, provided a solution (7/8, 1/8), creating the concept 
of expected value. 
Paciolo worked on the basis of past facts. Th e starting point for the correct 
solution worked out by Pascal were the possible results the players could expect 
at the current state of the game if it was continued.20 Th is is where an increasingly 
deep and wide gap lies today between risk analysts studying future possibilities 
and accountants and lawyers focussing primarily on past facts. 
Maybe it was this conﬂ ict that recently ushered in the notion of mar-
ket value in accounting, which is quite alien to the traditional account-
ing paradigm. Concepts belonging to the realm of probability theory 
have become increasingly frequent also in the legislation. Regretfully, 
probability theory as a distinct discipline has vanished in recent years 
from Hungarian tertiary education in economics.
20  In our example, if the game was to continue, it would end aft er three more trials at most. Th e 
player at a disadvantage could win only if he was to succeed in all three trials. Otherwise, his coun-
terpart would obtain the required number of successes. His odds of succeeding in all three trials are 
1/23 = 1/8. Accordingly, the odds of the other player are 7/8. 
Th e problem was originally rendered in more abstract terms, but I did not want to abuse readers’ 
attention and patience, and therefore provided a simpliﬁ ed example with concrete terms. For more 
detail, type ‘Problem of points’ into Google.
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How does exchange rate risk look like?
Like this? Like an ECG?
Chart 3 
Intra-day stock price movements
Th ose who see risks like that must not have had many second thoughts about 
taking out a foreign currency loan. Yes, there certainly is some ﬂ uctuation, but 
what goes up must come down.
Prospective foreign currency borrowers must have been more careful if they had 
seen a chart like this: 
Chart 4 
Daily USD/HUF exchange rates from 1999 to 2005: 220  320  180
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What can be concluded from the chart above is that while the exchange rate rose 
from 220 to 320 in less than 2 years, it took 4 years to sink back to 180. I reckon 
that placing 20 billboards with this chart along the roads of Hungary would have 
done more to raise awareness in the early days of FX lending than the pages and 
pages of ﬁ ne print inserted into lending contracts. 
But these days, regulation gets increasingly bulky, going into ever more detail. It 
is getting harder to ﬁ nd out what a drug is actually good for from the longer and 
longer medication package inserts. Th eir true purpose is to prevent legal disputes. 
My favourite one is the following warning in the package insert of a painkiller for 
headaches: ‘it may cause a headache’. It was on purpose that I provided examples 
from ﬁ elds other than ﬁ nance.
‘You shall not kill’ is concise and clear. However, such a phrasing is no longer 
considered professional. 
3.4 Gamma swap
Anyone can notice that computers and the Internet have made trading and 
settlement incredibly fast and they have practically removed geographical borders. 
Th e workings and eﬀ ects of computer-controlled automated trading strategies in a 
milliseconds environment are hard to grasp. But we all know that they exist.
By contrast, few banking professionals and securities market participants are 
aware of the fact that dozens of university graduates are writing their thesis 
each year in subjects like Th e eff ect of jumps on a down corridor variance swap, 
packed with integrals and stochastic diﬀ erential equations. Th ey understand 
the formulae well but oft en forget to mention what market participants entering 
into such swap transactions actually buy. Common reference literature are the 
Volatility Investing Handbook (BNP Paribas) and similar works. 
What is the subject-matter of a gamma swap? See below:
I wish to quickly reassure readers who may be losing their patience or starting to 
lose track that they are not alone. Do people really have to trade in these things?!
I have no idea what kind of billboard would be needed to call unsuspecting clients’ 
attention to the kinds of risk these transactions entail. Not to mention parents 
sending their children to university to obtain a degree in economics but they leave 
it as gamma traders. Th ey will make good money at least.
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We no longer invest in the textile or pharmaceutical industry but in volatility. 
Which itself would not be a problem if it was complemented by extensive 
professional knowledge in economics. But that is not the case.
I am sure that readers would be sceptical upon hearing that there are only a 
handful of young economists these days. I mean economists with a public policy 
orientation.21 Secondly, there is an increasing diﬀ erence between the studies of a 
student of ﬁ nance learning the mathematics of derivatives, an ordinary student of 
business administration and management and a securities lawyer. Surprisingly, 
studies in mathematics in general and in probability theory in particular are 
gradually disappearing from Hungarian tertiary education in economics at a 
time when the ﬁ nancial environment becomes more and more risky. Th e fact that 
about two soccer teams of students study in-depth, highly abstract mathematics 
does not really make a diﬀ erence. Back in 1920, the Palatine Joseph University of 
Technology and Economics (a predecessor of Budapest University of Technology 
and Economics) was the ﬁ rst university in Europe to oﬀ er a business programme 
in which statistics and probability theory were taught as individual subjects.22 
It is untenable to leave thorough technical and mathematical knowledge to 
became a private matter of a few professionals. In her 2012 book Quiet, Susan 
Cain concluded that one of the main reasons behind the 2008 crises was that 
extrovert managers failed to listen to introvert analysts. She cites the space shuttle 
Challenger disaster as an example, where experts warned that there will be sealing 
failures in temperatures below zero. Th e development path ﬁ nancial markets 
take may be regarded as scientists’ business only as much as global warming or 
environmental pollution.
 
21  Economists who are concerned with unemployment, inﬂ ation and current account deﬁ cit and 
had corresponding studies at the university. Th ey are an endangered species, closer to extinction 
than snowcap hummingbirds in South America. 
Almost all bigger Hungarian cities oﬀ er a training programme that awards a degree in econom-
ics, but these are all popular fast-track programmes in tourism and hospitality, marketing, change 
management or communication. By contrast, the monetary policy study track could not be launched 
at the University of Economics due to lack of interest. Student grants oﬀ ered by MNB put an end to 
that unhappy situation.
22  ‘Th ere was no country other than Hungary in continental Europe, where there was systematic 
teaching of probability and statistics as early as 1920’ (www.encyclopediaofmath.org),
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4. IN SUMMARY
Th e domestic banking system and securities market has evolved signiﬁ cantly in 
the last 30 years. Queuing before bank windows for hours with no chairs around, 
just like in a post oﬃ  ce, is now the distant past. Debiting your bank account with 
your parking fees or train ticket is just a few taps away on your smartphone and 
you can pay by your Hungarian bank card in a Vienna coﬀ eehouse.
But we all know that where there is light, there must be shadow. Th e greatest 
risk today is posed by the array of banking products which have been developed 
with the express purpose of risk management. It is not without reason that they 
are called toxic assets. Of course, it is not the products that are inherently toxic, 
but the way they are used. Let me cite Sándor Lámfalussy’s views from a lecture 
he held at MNB in 1997: ‘Nowadays, there is a hype about dandy derivatives in 
university education. It is time to shift  the focus of teaching back onto “normal, 
regular, boring banking”.’ His words surprised me then but I think I understand 
now why he called for caution. 
Th e fate of banks in the future (or in the next 30 years, if you like) will depend, 
in addition to numerous other factors, ﬁ rst and foremost on future bankers and 
bank supervisors. 
We have ample cause to be hopeful and also to be worried.
JÁNOS SZÁZ78
APPENDIX
Supplementary charts
Relative changes in the USD exchange rate and the BUX index in the long-term
Chart 5 shows the development of the daily closing prices of the BUX index over a 
22-year period. Based on this chart, it is hard to believe that the BSE index was the 
second most rapidly growing stock exchange index in the world in 1996. Unlike 
this chart, the lower logarithmic scale does not play down the signiﬁ cance of 
developments in the 1990s. Th e chart at the bottom indicates how many times the 
baseline value of the index has doubled until a speciﬁ c point in time.
Chart 5
Development of the BUX on the fi rst 5,500 trading days
Source: portfolio.hu
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Chart 6
Development of the BUX quotient logarithm
In the 3 years from March 1995, there was a progress of almost 3 along the log 
scale, i.e. the index has grown almost eightfold. During the 5 years of the great 
boom between 2002 and 2007, there was a progress of slightly above 2, i.e. there 
was ‘only’ a slightly more than fourfold increase in the index value. Only the log 
scale shows that the boom is fairly ﬂ at.
Let us get back to the problem discussed at the beginning of this paper: what does 
the exchange rate chart of a currency suggest? Th e inverse exchange rate chart 
sends a wholly diﬀ erent message about signiﬁ cant exchange rate ﬂ uctuations. It 
makes the issue even more complicated that the inverse of the expected exchange 
rate is not equivalent to the expected value of the inverse exchange rate.
In other words, when it is equally probable that the USD/HUF exchange rate will 
be 180, 200 or 220, it can be expected that it will be 200. If the current exchange 
rate is 200, a change is not to be expected. Th e inverse exchange rate behaves 
diﬀ erently. Using the values above, the value of HUF 1,000 in USD may be 5.56, 
5.00 or 4.55. Th e corresponding expected value is 5.03, so an American analyst 
would forecast that the HUF will appreciate, while a colleague in Budapest would 
expect no change (Siegel’s paradox). 23
23  One of the analysts considers the exchange rate a martingale (the expected future exchange rate 
is equal to the current exchange rate), while the other does not. Martingale is a key concept in mod-
ern ﬁ nancial mathematics. Th e martingale property of a process decides whether arbitrage is pos-
sible. In our example, the two analysts completely agree about possible values and their probabilities, 
and there is no conﬂ ict between them in terms of political views or interests. And yet...
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Th e log scale does not only allow for a more realistic comparison over time but 
it also makes it irrelevant whether we look at the dynamics of the USD/HUF 
exchange rate or its inverse. Sign will be the only diﬀ erence.
Chart 7
Base index of the USD/HUF exchange rate and base index
of the value of HUF 1,000 in USD on a logarithmic scale
Moving one mark up in the chart at the top, the USD/HUF exchange rate doubles. 
Moving one mark down in the chart at the bottom, the HUF/USD exchange rate 
halves.24
Maybe so many charts in such a short paper made readers weary, but let me remind 
them of the truth in the old Chinese proverb: A picture is worth a thousand words.
If we look at it closely.
24  Charts 6 and 7 are binary logarithms of the base index of the exchange rate concerned and there-
fore focus on doubling and halving in the exchange rate value.
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